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The Sensitivity Argument Against Child Euthanasia 
 
 
Abstract: Is there a moral difference between euthanasia for terminally ill 
adults and euthanasia for terminally ill children? Luc Bovens considers five 
arguments to this effect, and argues that each is unsuccessful. In this paper, I 
argue that Bovens’ dismissal of the sensitivity argument is unconvincing. 
Keywords: Euthanasia, Palliative Care, Clinical Ethics 
 
Luc Bovens argues that,[1] 
(A) There is no good reason to think that our best moral arguments for 
adult euthanasia do not justify child euthanasia to the same extent. 
Here, adult euthanasia refers to voluntary euthanasia for terminally 
ill patients above the age of 18, and child euthanasia for those below the age 
of 18. Given (A), Bovens must show that the following claim is false: 
(B) There exists at least one moral difference between adult euthanasia 
and child euthanasia, such that our best moral arguments for adult 
euthanasia do not justify child euthanasia to the same extent. 
I argue that Bovens fails to show that (B) is false. Bovens considers 
five arguments in favour of (B), and argues that each is unsuccessful. I claim 
that Bovens’ dismissal of one of these arguments is unsuccessful, such that 
Bovens provides no decisive reason to reject (B). Consider the sensitivity 
argument (SA): 
Children have a stronger desire to satisfy their parental expectations 
compared to the desire that adults have to satisfy familial expectations. A 
child will be more sensitive, for example, to the emotional drain that 
prolonged palliative care places on their parents. A child might, therefore, 
opt for euthanasia even though they would prefer to continue palliative care, 
with the intention of alleviating their parents’ suffering. Adults are less 
sensitive to familial expectations, and are unlikely to choose euthanasia 
unless it is the right course of action for them.[1] 
 Two clarifications about SA: First, SA must not be confused with the 
coercion argument. The claim is not that if child euthanasia is legal, then 
parents might coerce children into euthanasia to alleviate their own suffering 
without considering the best interests of the child. SA concerns the child’s 
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increased sensitivity to their parents’ wishes in the case that the parents have 
not directly expressed these wishes to the child. For example, the child might 
prefer the option of prolonged palliative care, but opt for euthanasia because 
they believe it will alleviate their parents’ suffering. 
 Second, SA is an argument for (B): SA identifies a moral difference 
between adult euthanasia and child euthanasia. Children are more sensitive 
to familial expectations compared with adults. Our best arguments for 
euthanasia assume that suffering individuals can make a free and informed 
decision in accordance with their personal preferences. SA challenges the 
idea that children are free to choose euthanasia or palliative care in 
accordance with their personal preferences, in virtue of their increased 
sensitivity to parental expectations. If the moral distinction drawn in SA is 
robust, then (B) is true. 
 Bovens claims that, for SA to succeed, it must be the case that: 
(C) The probability of a child succumbing to parental pressure and 
opting for euthanasia against their personal preferences is greater 
than the prob bility of an adult succumbing to familial pressure and 
undertaking euthanasia against their personal preferences. 
Conversely, Bovens claims that for SA to fail, it must be the case that: 
(D) The probability of a child succumbing to parental pressure and 
opting for euthanasia against their personal preferences is less than 
or equal to the probability of an adult succumbing to familial 
pressure and undertaking euthanasia against their personal 
preferences. 
I agree with Bovens on the conditions under which SA succeeds and 
fails as an argument for (B). I take it that empirical studies attempting to 
establish which of (C) or (D) is true would face significant ethical challenges. 
Given this constraint, the dispute over which of (C) or (D) is correct must be 
settled by considering the strength of reasons for and against these claims. 
Bovens provides two reasons to believe that (D) is true.[1] First, the 
pressures exhibited from children towards ageing parents, who face a choice 
between palliative care and euthanasia, are plausibly greater than the 
pressure that parents are likely to impose on children in the same 
circumstances. Second, Bovens argues that parents feel stronger obligations 
“to make things well” for their children, than children do towards their 
parents. The first reason provides some motivation for (D), but at present, 
this reason is a speculation and not a decisive argument in favour of (D). For 
the second reason, it might be true that parents feel stronger obligations to 
“make things well” for their children, but it does not follow that children will 
be insensitive to the fact that euthanasia could alleviate significant stress for 
their parents. 
Bovens’ more interesting claim is that even if minors are more 
sensitive to familial expectations compared with adults, this is not a decisive 
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reason to think that (C) is true, rather than (D). As Bovens understands it, 
SA assumes that familial expectations will favour euthanasia. But, Bovens 
contends, familial expectations could equally well favour prolonged palliative 
care. Hence, it might also be the case that parents pressure their children to 
undertake further palliative care (against the child’s personal preferences), 
because the parents cannot entertain the thought of letting-go. 
Christopher Kaczor attempts to refute Bovens’ objection to SA: 
“Bovens overlooks that even a small amount of pressure by an 
authority figure will typically have disproportionate actual force on 
any child, particularly a sick child. Some parents will exert pressure 
on a sick and sensitive child in order to make their own lives easier. 
Children merit extra protection because they are generally more 
sensitive than adults.”[2] 
There are three claims here. The final claim is a restatement of SA, 
providing no reason to believe that Bovens’ objection fails. The first and 
second claims require more careful attention. First, 
(E) Even a small amount of pressure by an authority figure will have 
disproportionate actual force on any child, particularly a sick child. 
This might be true. But Kaczor conflates the sensitivity argument 
with the coercion argument. In the present discussion, claims about the 
explicit pressure exerted onto children are not relevant. We are interested in 
whether children are more sensitive to familial expectations, and whether 
this increases the probability that children will opt for euthanasia when it is 
not their personal preference to do so. Second consider, 
(F) Some parents will exert pressure on a sick and sensitive child in order 
to make their own lives easier. 
Again, this might be true. But Kaczor conflates coercion with 
sensitivity. Kaczor makes no attempt to challenge Bovens’ claim that SA does 
not provide a decisive reason in favour of (C), because children might be 
sensitive to their parents’ desire for the child to undergo further palliative 
care. It is clear, then, that Kaczor does not undermine Bovens’ objection to 
SA. 
I believe that Bovens’ objection to SA faces a problem that Kaczor 
does not consider. Let us grant that Bovens is correct about the following: 
The increased sensitivity of children makes terminally-ill children 
vulnerable to succumbing to their parental expectations and opting for either 
palliative care or euthanasia against their personal preference. 
It does not follow that SA provides no reason to favour (C) over (D), 
which Bovens requires to undermine SA. Notice that SA’s support for (C) 
holds irrespective of whether SA lends support to the claim that children are 
vulnerable to opt for prolonged palliative care against their personal 
preferences in virtue of their increased sensitivity to parental pressure. SA 
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states that children are more sensitive to familial pressures compared to 
adults. (C) states that the probability of a child succumbing to parental 
pressure and opting for euthanasia against their personal preferences is 
greater than the probability of an adult succumbing to familial pressure and 
undertaking euthanasia against their personal preferences. The inference 
from SA to (C) holds irrespective of whether children’s increased sensitivity 
to parental expectations increases the probability that children will opt for 
palliative care against their personal preferences. 
Bovens’ mistake is to pitch the two probabilities as a zero-sum game. 
If children are more likely to opt for palliative care than adults, in virtue of 
their increased sensitivity to familial expectations, this does not detract from 
the probability that children are more likely to opt for euthanasia than 
adults, in virtue of their increased sensitivity to familial expectations. To 
show that SA does not support (C), Bovens must show that SA supports (D), 
where the two probabilities are zero-sum. Bovens’ observation about 
sensitivity and palliative care does not support (D). The sensitivity of 
children to familial expectations of prolonged palliative care is logically 
independent of the comparative sensitivity of adults and children to familial 
pressure towards euthanasia. 
I believe that Bovens’ argument is repairable. But this will require 
significant elaboration on the two reasons given in favour of (D). At present, 
Bovens’ argument fails to undermine the force of SA, and in turn, fails to 
establish that there is no good reason to think that our best moral arguments 
for adult euthanasia do not justify child euthanasia to the same extent. 
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